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Negligence-PersonalLiability of Selectmen of a Town.
In an action for negligence by a man employed in constructing a
sewer against the selectmen of a town by whom he was directly hired, it
was aid: "In building the sewer the selectmen were perforning a
ministerial duty, belonging to them by virtue of their office. While the
sewer when built belonged to the town, its construction was not the performance of a duty imposed by general laws upon it for general benefit,
but a construction authorized by a town for its benefit and that of its inhabitants. The defendants employed the plaintiff, not a competent
superintendent, to employ him, and whether they were acting as public
officers or agents or not, did not alter their duty to him. The fact that
the town might also be liable did not relieve them, nor can the case be
compared to an agent following the directions of his principalas to hiring
and setting a person-to work without any control or direction himself in
relation to the matter, as the defendants had full control over the work."
Abstract from opinion of MORTON, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This case was, as stated in the opinion, an action of tort
brought against the defendants, individually, as selectmen bf
the town of Greenfield, Mass., for negligently failing to provide suitable means of support for the sides of a trench in
which they had employed the plaintiff to lay pipe for the purpose of building a public sewer in one of the streets of the
town. The injury occurred not from a defect in the plan of
the sewer, but through a failure to support the sides of the
trench in the course of its construction. " The building of
the sewer was in the control of the defendants. . . . In
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building the sewer they were performing a ministerial duty
for the benefit of the town. This duty belonged to them
by virtue of their office, but was, nevertheless, ministerial.
.

.

.

The defendants were not bound to hire tfie plain-

tiff, and set him to work in the bottom of the trench; but,
having done so, they are liable to him for any injury which
occurred to him in the course of his employment through
any negligence on their part. Whether they were acting
as public officers or agents or not, could, under the circumstances, make no difference as to their duty to the plaintiff.
. . . The fact that the town may also be liable does
not relieve then. . . . It is not the case of an agent,

following the directions of his principal as to hiring and
setting a person to work without any control or direction
*himself in relation to the matter, and acting only within
the strict line of his authority. The defendants had full
control over the work, over the hiring of the men to do it,
and, if they chose to exercise it, over the manner in which
it should be done; and they hired and set the plaintiff to
work in a place where he was injured. It is a question for
the jury whether his injury was due to any neglect on their
part to take proper precautions for his safety."
INDrWDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OV PUBLIC OFICIALS FOR ACTS OF
NEGLIGENCE.

Public officers whose tenure of privileges of sovereignty attach to
office is dependent upon political them. For their actions within the
considerations owe no duties, in limits of their powers, or for, a
the performance of their official neglect to perform their duties,
trust, to individuals, but exclusively they are responsible to the public,
to the public. For non-perform- and no liability exists towards inance or negligent performance of dividuals who may suffer special
these duties, the citizen who suf- injury: Shearman & Redfield on
fers in consequence has no indi- Negligence, 4th ed., 252, 253, 302.
vidual right of redress. The func- Thus, the motives inducing a Govtions of the sovereignty of neces- ernor's official alttion are not the
sity must be exercised by executive, subject of inquiry by an individual:
legislative and judicial officers, and Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., *377. Nor
subordinate agents in their depart- can members of the legislature
ments. Such officials are repre- personally be held civilly liable for
sintatives of the State, performing their legislative action, and the docthe governmental powers specially trine applies as well to municipal
councils: Baker v. State, Ind., 27
assigned to them. As such, the
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485; Walker v. Hallock, 32 Id.,
239; Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss., io9;
Borough of Freeport v. Marks; 59
Pa., 253; Cooley on Torts, 2d ed.,
"372.
The exemption from responsibility to individuals for official acts
also extends tojudicialofficers;but
a distinction is madebetweenjudges
of courts of record and judges of
inferior jurisdiction. The latter
must not act beyond their limited
jurisdiction. If it is shown that an
inferior magistrate acted in bad
faith; or with fraud or malice, he is
iable to the ihijured suitor, though
acting within his jurisdiction; but
though a suitor in a court of record
suffer by a violation of the judge's
duty, by his corr~tion or oppression, he has no personal redress,
since the wrong" committed by the
judge is done the public; the complaitant's legal controversy is considered as being merely the occasion for the wrong, and impeachment is the only punishment:
Shqarman & Redfield on Negligence, 4th ed., H 3o3, etseq. Thus
in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson,
282, 291, Chancellor KENT (then
Chief Justice) said: "The doctrine
which holds a judge exempt from
civil suit or indictment for any act
done or omitted to be done by
him, sitting as judge, has a deep
root in the common law. It is to
be found in the earliest judicial
records, and it has- been steadily
,maintained by an undisturbed current of decisions in the English
courts, amidst every change of
policy and through every revolution of their government." SerjeanHAwxINS has said: "That the law
has freed the judges of all courts
of record from all prosecutions
whatsoever, except in the Parliament, for anything done by them

.openly in such courts as judges.
For the authbrity of government
cannot be maintained unless the
greatest credit be given to those
who are so highly entrusted with
the administration of public justice, and that if they should be
exposed to the prosecution of those
whose partiality to their own causes
would induce them to think themselves injured, it would be impossible for them to keep in the people
that veneration of their persons
and submission to their judgments
without which it is impossible to
execute the laws with vigor and
success:" see Yates v. Lansing, 9
Johnson, 395. "If by any mistake
in the exercise Qf his office a judge'
should injure an individual, hard.
would be his condition if he were
to be responsible therefor for
damages. The rules and principles
which govern, in the exercise of
judicial power are not, in all cases,
obvious; they are often complex
and appear under different aspects
to different persons.
No man
would accept the office of judge if
his estate were to answer for every
error in judgment, or if his time
and property were to be wasted in
litigations with every man whom
his decisions might offend. It is,
therefore, a settled principle that
however erroneous his judgment
may be, either by positive acts,
neglect, or refusal to do certain
acts, or 'however injurious to a
suitor, a judge is never liable in
any civil action for damages arising
from his mistake ": Phelps v. Sill,
I Day (Conn.), 315, 329; I Shearman
& Redfield on Negligence, 4th ed.,
S303, and notes; Cooley on Torts,
2d ed., ch. 14; 12 Am. and Eng.
Ency. of Law, 32; 19 Id., 486. In
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wallace, 335,
351, FIELD, J., held "that judges
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of courts of superior or general.
jurisdiction are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even
when such acts are in excess of
their jurisdiction, and are alleged to
have been done maliciously or corruptly. . . . Where there is clearly
no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter any authority exercised is a
usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the
want of jurisdiction is known to
the judge, no excuse is permissible." See also Lange v. Benedict,
73 N. Y., 12; S.C., 8 Hun, 362; 18
Wallace, 163; 99 U. S., 68; Houlden
v. Smith, 14 Q. B., 841. Inferior
magistrates are relieved of responsibility to suitors before them when
they have acted honestly and in
good faith in a judicial matter
within their jurisdiction: i Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 4th
ed., 307, and notes.
But, as was said by BEARDSLEY,
J., in Wilson v. New York, i Denio,
595, 599, "duties which are purely
ministerial in their nature are
sometimes cast upon officers whose
chief functions arejudicial.Where
this occurs, and the ministerial duty
is violated, the officer, although for
most purposes a judge, is still civilly responsible for such misconduct." See Cooley on Torts, 2d ed.,
378.
In Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind.,
569, 572, a ministerial office was defined to be one which gave the officer no power to judge of the matter
to be done, and requires him to obey
the mandates of a superior; a ministerial office may be exercised by
a deputy, while a judicial office
cannot be so exercised. In Penniugton v.Streight, 54 Ind., 376, 377
(following Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Id., 169), a ministerial act

was defined "to be one which a*
person performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to, or the
exercise of, his own judgment upon
the propriety of the act being
done." A ministerial act is that
which is done under the orders of
a superior: SNEED, J., in Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heiskell (Tenn.),
488, 502. Where the law prescribes
and defines the duties to,be performed with such precision and
certainty as to leave nothing to the
exercise of discretion or judgment,
the act is ministerial; but where
the act to be done involves the ex- ercise of discretion or judgment, it
is not to be deemed merely ministerial: BONNER, J., in Rains v.
Simpson, 50 Texas, 495, 5o i . A
ministerial duty is one in respect
to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty,
arising under conditions admitted
or proved to exist, and imposed by
law: CHASE, C. J., in State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475,
498.
It may be stated as a broad proposition that for negligently performing ministerial duties, or for omission to perform them, or for acting
without authority, or in excess of it,
a public official is responsible, at
the suit of a private individual, for
damages suffered by him as a consequence: Shearman & Redfield on
Negligence, 4th ed., 313; 19 Am.
and Eng. Ency. of Law, 49 o , et
seq. Discretionary duties concern
the public primarily and specially;
they concern individuals only incidentally: therefore the individual
cannot hold the officer responsible
for his negligent performance of
such duties. Judge CooruY thus
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'states the rule: "If the duty which
the official authority imposes upon
an officer is a duty to the public, a
failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance,
must be a public, not an individual,
injury, and must be redressed, if at
all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the
duty is a duty to the individual,
then a neglect to perform it, or to
perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an
-individual action for damages-1"
Cooley on' Torts, 2d ed., *379.
But a duty owing an individual
must have a definite origin, and be
more or less explicit in its scope.
Thus in Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N. Y., 389, a superintendent
employed by the State canal commissioners, puirsuant to law, to
keep a portion of the canals in
proper condition and repair, was
held liable to the plaintiff, who was
specially damaged by a neglect of
his duty. PCKHAM, J., acquiesced
in the rule laid down by BRONSON,
J., in Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 63o ,
632, that "when an individual sustains an injury by the misfeasance
or nonfeasance of a public officer,
who acts, or omits to act, contrary
to his -duty, the law gives-redress to
the injured party by an action
adapted to the nature of the case."
SMITi, J., said: "The defendant
by his contract assumed the absolute duty of repairing a public
thoroughfare, and is therefore liable
in a civil action in behalf of
any individual who has sustained
special damage as the immediate
consequence of his neglect to repair. . . . His duty being absolute, unconditional and fixed,
differs from that of commissioners
of highways, upon whom no duty
to repair attaches until funds are

provided for that purpose by the
public: " 34 N. Y., 402-3; Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 29 Id., 297. In
Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 63b, a superintendent of 'repairs on the Erie
Canal was held individually responsible for allowing a sunken
boat to obstruct navigation to the
injury of the plaintiff's passing
boat. It was his duty to remove
the obstruction without waiting for
orders from the commissioners.
Likewise in Shepherd v. Lincoln,
17 Wendell, 250, it was held that a
superintendent of repairs on the
canals of the State was personally
liable for damages sustained by an
individual through the negligence
of his workmen, and the fact that
he was the agent of the State was
immaterial, since his duties were
definite.
- In Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 29 N.
Y., 297, the plaintiff sued the.commissioners of highways for damages caused by the fall of a bridge
while his stage c6ach was crossing
it. A recovery was denied, because
the commissioners had neglected
no duty, inasmuch as they 'wererepairing bridges, and insufficiency
of funds prevented them from improving all under their care. It
was said by JOHNSON, J. (p. 304):
"They owed no duty to any one to
undertake more than the funds in
their hands would complete and
pay for; and they necessarily had
a discretion to exercise as to which
of the bridges in the town -they
would undertake to repair. This
discretion, for aught that appears,
they exercised in good faith." As
WR GH T, J., said (p. 312): "For
the exercise of that discretion they
cannot be made responsible in a
civil action." The same judge also
said "that town commissioners of
highways are, in no event, liable
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to a private action for a mere
neglect or omission to keep the
highways of their towns in repair,"
and he repudiated the rule enunciated by BRONSON, J., in Adsit v.
Brady, sufira. But this view was'
not that of the majority of the
court, and the contrary has since
been well established: Robinson v.
Chamberlain, 34 N. Y., 389; Hover
v. Barkhoof, 44 Id., X13; Clark v.
Miller, 54 Id., 528; Bennett v. Vhitney, 94 Id., 302; Cooley on Torts,
2d ed., *399, *400.
In Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y.,
113, the commissioners of highways were held liable for damages
resulting from the unsafe condition
of a bridge which it was their duty
to keep in repair. The commissioners had the power to obtain the
means for rebuilding, but they did
not exercise it, preferring to make
temporary repairs, and postpone
rebuildinguntil spring. LiONARD,
Com., said (p. 116): "One who assumes the duties, and is invested
with the powers of a public officer,
is liable to an individual who sustains special damage by a neglect
propxly to perform such duties."
EARL, Com., said (p. 125): "Commissioners of highways, having the
requisite funds in hand, or under
their control, are bound to repair
bridges which are out of repair,
they having notice of their condition; and they are bound to repair
them with reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence, and if they
omit this duty they are liable to
individuals who sustain special
damage from such neglect." See
Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., *' 399,
*400.

In Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y., 528,
a town supervisor was held responsible in damages for neglecting to
present to the board of supervisors
3

the plaintiffs claim for damages as
reassessed, occasioned by the laying
out of a highway through his lands;
the supervisor presented the first
assessment, alleging the second to
have been unconstitutional. It was
held that as he was a ministerial
officer, whose duties were made
absolute and certain by statute, he
was responsible to the plaintiff; and
the fact that his conduct was
prompted by an honest (though
erroneous) belief in the unconstitutionality of the reassessment, would
not relieve him from the consequences of his disobedience.
In Bennett v. Whitney, 94N. Y.,
302, the mayor, members of common council and the street commissioner of Binghamton were sued
in their individual names, with the
title of their respective offices
added, for negligently leaving unguarded and unlighted an opening
temporarily made in a street of the
city. By the city charter the defendants were made commissioners
of highways. It was held that the
defendants were individually responsible. FINCH, J., said (p. 3o6):
"One who assumes the duties and
is invested with the powers of a
public officer is liable to an individual who sustains special damage
by a neglect properly to perform
such duties." (P. 308): "Itwasnot
a case of nonfeasance or omission
to act at all, where in some cases as
to the repair of highways it may be
necessary to show adequate means
in the hands of the officer, but a
case of misfeasance, where the
officer had acted, but conducted
himself negligently, to the special
injury of an individual."
In Piercy v. Averill, 37 Hun.
36o, suit was brought against the
mayor and aldermen, constituting
the common council of the city of
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Ogdensburg, who were invested by
law with the powers of commissioners of highways, for negligently
permitting the accumulation of
snow and ice on a sidewalk, and
suffering it to remain'in a dangerous condition, i.nconsequence of
which the plaintiff was personally
injured. It was held that the duty
6f keeping the sidewalks and streets
in repair was ministerial, and for
its negligent performance the defendants were liable for the plaintiff's injuries. The fact that the
municipality was exempt will not
relieve its agents of personal liability for individual wrongful acts in
violation of their public duties.
See also, Robinson v. Chamberlain,
34 N. Y., 389; Bennett v. Whitney,
94 Id., 302.
In McCord v: High, 24 Iowa, 336,

a road supervisor was held responsible for damages suffered by a
land-owner in consequence of the
construction of a crossing over a
stream having diverted the water
from his land. The plaintiff had
no remedy against the road district,
township or county. Bucm, J.,
naid (p. 343): "The fact of an
officer being clothed with discrelion in the discharge of a duty as
-tothe mannerof its performance,
.of as to the control of circum-stances and attendant acts neces.sarily arising in the discharge of
.-such duty, will not give to it a
judicial character. It is impossible
to conceive of any ministerial duty
:to be performed by an officer that
-may not be, that is not, accompanied by circumstances which require the exercise ofjudgment and
discretion." (P. 342): "It surely
cannot be claimed that a road supervisor is clothed with such disretion, with such judicial duties

and powers, that he may divest or
diminish the water of a stream
without rendering to the owner of
the property compensation therefor." DILLON, C. J., said (p. 350):
"Where a public officer, other than
a judicial one, does an act directly
invasive of the private rights of
others, and there is otherwise no
remedy for the injury, such officer
is personally liable without proof
of malice and an intent to injure."
In McOsker v. Burrell, 55 Ind., 425,
in obedience to a statute a supervisor constructed a dam which
caused the 'water in the stream to
overflow the plaintiffs 'land.
It
was held he was not personally responsible because he acted in good
faith, and it was not shown that -he
acted without reasonable care, corruptly or maliciously." PERKINS,
J., said (p. 428): "A supervisor,
acting within the scope of his authority in good faith, should not be
liable to an action in his natural
capacity for acts so done in his.
official capacity."
In Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen,
166, the tender of a drawbridge,
appointed by the governor, whose
duty was to permit no unnecessary
detention of vessels, having due
regard and caution for the public
travel, was held liable to a person
injured by falling into the river
through his failure to hang out a
lantern at night while opening the
draw.
In Morse v. Sweenie, 15 Bradwell (ill. App.), 486, the fire
marshal of the city of Chicago
was held liable for negligently colliding with the plaintiff's team
while going to a fire.
In Jones v. Bird, 5 Barn. & Ald.,
837, the commissioners of sewers
were held responsible. for negli-
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gently repairing a sewer, whereby
the plaintiff's house was injured.See, also, Murphy v'. City ofLowell,
124 Mass., 564; Breen v. Field, 31
N. E. Rep., 1075.
In Hall v. Smith, 2 Bingham,
156, i59, BST, C. J.j said: "If commissioners, under an Act of Parliament, order something to be done
which is not within the scope of
their authority, or are themselves
guilty of negligence in doing that
which they are empowered to do,
they render themselves liable to an
action, but they are not answerable
for the misconduct of such as they
are obliged to employ."
In Schinotti v. Bumsted, 6 T. R.,
646, commissioners of alottery authorized by lawwere held liable for
neglecting to award a prize to the
holder of a ticket entitled to receive
it. Lord KiNYoN, C: J., said (p.
649): "The commissioners of the
lottery are mere ministerial officers."
In Hayes v. Porter, 22 Maine,
371, a deputy inspector of meats
was held liable for negligently inspecting certain meat of the plaintiff, which thereby became worthless. While the public depend upon
the inspection of provisions as a
sanitary regulation, yet it is at least
equally important to individuals
who in reliance upon it are induced
to purchase: Cooley on Torts, 2d
ed., *39o.
In Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N. Y.,
379, the captain of a steamship at
quarantine was held liable for damages by reason of the plaintiff's
child having died from the effects
of drinking poison which had been
used in fumigation but had not
been removed from the steerage
when the steward ordered the passengers to re-enter it. Itwas within
the line of the captain's duty to see
that the poison was removed.

Officers in the army and navy are
responsible to individuals injured as
a consequence of the negligent
performance of their duties. Thus
in Castle v. Duryee, 32 Barb., 480,
it was held that a colonel, who in
accordance with official orders was
drilling his regiment, could be held
liable for omitting a precaution he
should have taken, or improperly
giving an order to discharge musketry, whereby the plaintiff was
hurt. His official position exempted him from liability for authorized acts if he used reasonable
care and caution. See, also, Nicholson v. Mouncey, 15 East, 384;
Scott v. United States, 18 Ct. of Cl.

Rep.,

i.

The same liability attaches to
postmasters. In Kednan v. Southworth, IIO Mass., 474, GRAvY, J.,
said: "The law is well settled in
England and America that the
the deputy
postmaster-general,
postmasters and their assistants
and clerks, appointed and sworn as
required bylaw, are public officers,
each of whom is responsible for his
own negligence." But if a postmaster-general .while acting in the
line of duty is required to exercise
discretion, he cannot be held liable
for error of judgment: Kendall v.
Stokes, 3 Howard, 87; Cooley on
Torts, 2d ed., *391. As was said by
GRmNn, J., in Griffith v. Follett,
20 Barb., 62o, "when the law confides a discretion to its officers it
will not allow their acts done in
good faith, and within the limits of
that discretion, to be questioned."
When by commoin law or statute
the trust or duty is specific, the
officer entrusted therewith is liable
for its negligent performance.
Thus in jenner v. Joliffe, 9Johnson,
381, an officer with authority to
attach certain goods, who keeps
them in an unsafe place or exposes

